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Florida has been the state humorists most like to make fun of since the
2000 presidential election, especially when it comes to politics. And
humorists are almost the only commentators who can be counted on to tell
us the truth about the state of American politics today. When Californians
decided to recall their Governor, for example, Conan O'Brien observed:
"Yesterday Arnold Schwarzenegger announced he would run for governor
of California. The announcement was good news for Florida residents,
who now live in the second-flakiest state in the country."' And when more
than 200 people filed to run for Governor, Jay Leno put it this way:
"Election officials here in California are concerned that having 247
candidates would require a ballot so long it would be difficult to count.
Today in Florida they said, 'What? You count the ballots?' ' 2 And later on
in the campaign Jay Leno continued the theme: "Here's how bad
California looks to the rest of the country, people in Florida are laughing
at us."'3
Floridians may be used to it, having endured the barbs of their own
writer-humorist, Carl Hiaasen, for years. The main character of Hiaasen's
hilarious novel Sick Puppy4 is Boodle, a charming if demanding Labrador
retriever. The puppy wants to ingratiate himself to everyone and is equally
friendly to an unscrupulous lobbyist, a former governor, and a young
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1. James Sullivan, Take California-please!, PORTSMOUTH HERALD (Sept. 6, 2003),
available at http://www.seacoastonline.com/news/09062003/it/48813.htn.
2. Id.
3. DOUG'S DYNAMIC DRIVEL, ONE LINERS (Sept. 1,2003), at http://www.thealders.net/
blogs/archive/00 145 I.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
4. CARL HIAASEN, SimK Puppy (2000).
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ecoterrorist. Most people in Hiaasen's book could not resist the "spunky
charms" of the puppy; but some people could. Boodle could never be
taught to hunt, but could serve other purposes, like "household protection
duties."
The invitation to comment on Professor Lawrence Gostin's lead article
in this issue brought Hiaasen's novel of Florida politics almost
immediately to mind. I have commented before on the effort of Gostin and
his colleagues to get states to enact new emergency public health laws in
the wake of 9/11, and also have debated this issue with him before
audiences at the Cato Institute and the Health Law Teachers Annual
Meeting.5 Gostin is like Boodle in his ability to charm, and Gostin's new
piece promised to be more philosophical than political in nature,
explaining not the details of his legislative proposal, but the rationale for
them. Moreover, Florida has enacted by far the most extreme version of
Gostin's proposal. The opportunity to comment on the Florida version was
irresistable to me (or maybe I'm more like the aging rhinoceros, El Jefe,
in Sick Puppy, shipped to Florida for politicians to shoot in a fake African
safari, who was only awakened from his dottering lethargy when Boodle,
who only wanted to play, bit his tail).
September 1 th may not have changed everything, but it has certainly
changed many things, including Gostin's previous position that health and
human rights should be seen as "inextricably linked" natural allies, rather
than as natural enemies.6 Gostin began moving away from this position
after Jonathan Mann's death, when he became more involved with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).7 After 9/11, Gostin
5. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1337, 1338-39 (2002) [hereinafter Annas, Civil Liberties]; George J. Annas,
Bioterrorism. Public Health, and Human Rights, 21 HEALTH AFF. 94, 94-97 (2002); George J.
Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st Century, 13 HEALTH
MATRIX: J. LAw-MED. 33,45-63 (2003); George J. Annas, Terrorism andHuman Rights, in INTHE
WAKE OF TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY IN A TIE OF CRISIS 33, 34-49 (Jonathan D. Moreno
ed., 2003) [hereinafter WAKEOFTERROR]; George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health and Civil
Liberties, Panel Discussion, Speech before the 27th Annual Health Law Teachers Conference (June
6,2003) (same), at http://www.asmle.org/media/listspeaker.php?speech-id=l 47; George J. Annas,
Public Health and Private Rights: Communicable Diseases, Panic Attacks, and the Constitution,
Address at the Cato Institute (May 27, 2003) (panel discussion with Lawrence Gostin) at
http://www.cato.org/events/030527pf.html.
6. See Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
7, 16 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999); Lawrence 0. Gostin & Jonathan M. Mann, Toward the
Development of a Human Rights Impact Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation ofPublic
Health Policies, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 6.
7. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health, Ethics, and Human Rights: A Tribute to
the Late Jonathan Mann, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 121, 129 (2001) (questioning if"the individualistic
thinking inherent in ethics and human rights [is] always consistent with public health's focus on
collective well-being"); Stephen P. Marks, Jonathan Mann's Legacy to the 21st Century: The
Human Rights Imperative for Public Health, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 131, 131-32 (2001)
(responding to Gostin); Lawrence 0. Gostin, A Vision of Health and Human Rights for the 21st
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drafted an Ashcroft-like law, presenting the CDC with their very own
version of the USA Patriot Act: the Model State Emergency Public Health
Act (MSEPHA).8 Like the Patriot Act, it was based primarily on old
proposals that had little chance of being enacted prior to 9/11. The CDC
became much more politicized after 9/11, especially after the anthrax letter
attacks that followed. Gostin's proposal seemed to fit the Bush
Administration's new strategy justifying restrictions on civil liberties by
first inciting fear in Americans and then promising them safety in return
for more arbitrary authority.9 I think Gostin was right when he preached
the gospel of the new "health and human rights" in public health as a
coauthor of the movement's founder, Jonathan Mann. His current view is
dangerously wrong. Vigorous promotion of human rights really is
necessary for protecting human health, and health and human rights almost
always work together to strengthen each other. Even in times of
emergency (arguably, especially in times of emergency), undermining
human rights does more harm than good. Or, as Jay Leno put it in the
wake of the Iraq war, "The United States is putting together a Constitution
now for Iraq. Why don't we just give them ours? It's served us well for
200 years, and we don't appear to be using it anymore, so what the hell?"' 0
In his Article, Gostin attempts, as he puts it, to be "more explanatory
and analytical than prescriptive" in an attempt to "build a bridge between
two often diametrically opposing political theories."" In this brief
Commentary, I will argue first that the explanation and the analysis fail
becaute both rest on two false premises (that bioterrorism is the most
dangerous threat to Americans, and Americans must accept substantial loss
of civil liberties to deal with bioterrorism); and second, that Florida should
repeal portions of its emergency public health statute that it adopted at the
suggestion of Gostin and the CDC.
Century: A Continuing Discussion with Stephen P. Marks, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 139, 139-40
(2001) (responding to Marks). More recently Gostin seems to be hedging his bets. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., THE DOMAINs OF HEALTH RESPONSIVENESS: A HUMAN RIGHTS
ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://www3.who.int/whosis/discussion-papers/pdf/paper53.pdf.
8. The drafting process has been described by the participants in a number of publications.
E.g., James G. Hodge Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Protecting the Public's Health in an Era of
Bioterrorism: The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, in WAKE OF TERROR, supra note
5, at 17-32.
9. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: The Justice Department, Ashcroft Seeks
More Power to Pursue Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at Al.
10. DOUG'S DYNAMIC DRIVEL, supra note 3.
11. Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on
Personal and Economic Liberties Justified, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1168-69 (2003).
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I. No LAUGHING MATTER
Elaine Scarry argues persuasively that 9/11 may prove pivotal to
either turning the country further and further away from
democracy (as in the Bush administration's abridgment of
civil liberties, its pronouncements about the irrelevance of
"evidence" in conducting twenty-first-century wars, its
threats of "preemptive strikes" against the "axis of evil") or
instead turning us back to our democratic foundations by its
swift and stark exposure of the ineffectiveness of
nondemocratic military arrangements. 2
She asks, "Which way will we turn?" In the immediate aftermath of
9/11 it was easy for civil libertarians to despair. Not only did Congress
almost immediately pass the USA Patriot Act and authorize war on
terrorism, but the Bush Administration also announced that it would ignore
the United Nations and its rules regarding war, and would even disregard
fundamental international law as expressed in the Geneva Conventions. 3
More recently, however, the tide seems to be turning. Extreme and silly
governmental measures are now met with considerable skepticism, and
even active resistance. The color-coded terrorist warning system, for
example, has been all but abandoned as too vague to do anything more
than scare the public. Proposals to enlist mail carriers and TV repair
persons as "tipsters" (the so-called "TIPS" program) have been abandoned.
Duct tape and plastic sheeting remain punch lines in jokes about personal
protection from chemical and biological agents. And the Defense
Department's suggestion to set up a betting pool so people could wager on
the likelihood of future terrorist attacks went down in flames the same day
it was made public, even though this "market" approach was seen as
consistent with the Administration's overall private-market philosophy. 4
Why the change of attitude, if not of heart? I think at least part of the
answer lies in the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the
American public tQ believe what the Bush Administration says, and thus
to take the Bush Administration's warnings about imminent disaster
seriously.
Perhaps the best example of this is the "evidence" the Administration
used to convince the country to invade Iraq, specifically the risk that Iraq
12. ELAINE SCARRY, WHO DEFENDED THE COUNTRY? 89-90 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 2003).
13. Katherine Q. Seelye & David E. Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand on Treating Captives
of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at Al; Charles M. Sennott & Bryon Bender, US Handling of
War Captives Draws Fire, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2002, at Al.
14. Carl Hulse, Pentagon Prepares a Futures Market on Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMEs, July
29, 2003, at Al.
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would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Condelezza Rice, for
example, said "[w]e don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom
cloud."' 5 After the war, and with the continuing inability to find any so-
called weapons of mass destruction, the Administration has changed its
story from one that said Iraq had, or would shortly have, nuclear weapons
to one that said Iraq had a "nuclear weapons program."16
The Gostin approach is similar to the Bush Administration's approach
to the Iraqi war: scare them to death and then take power. In the first part
of his article, Gostin does his best to scare us with the threat of biological
weapons. They are scary, but not nearly as threatening as he portrays them.
His summary assertion is that "the use of bioterrorism is equally, if not
more, concerning than conventional (e.g., firearms or explosives),
chemical, or nuclear threats: it is readily available, inexpensive to produce,
more difficult to detect, and more efficient in its lethal effects.' 7 This
statement is, on its face, indefensible. No one, for example, seriously
suggested that the U.S. go to war with Iraq because it possessed chemical
or biological weapons. We have known about these weapons for more than
two decades, and Iraq has actually used its chemical weapons on both
civilian and military targets. No, it was the future prospect of possessing
much more dangerous nuclear weapons that scared us into war. Nothing
carries the destructive power of nuclear weapons. But it is not nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons that most national security experts in the
U.S. fear most. Rather, it is the threats posed by the use of conventional
explosives, including so-called "dirty bombs" (a conventional bomb that
also contains radioactive material), whose major impact will not be "mass"
population destruction, but potential mass terror.' 8
Gostin does his best to portray the dangers of a variety of biological
weapons, but is consistently inconsistent in his descriptions. At one point,
for example, he tells us that "a single gram of crystalline botulinum toxin,
evenly dispersed and inhaled, could kill more than one million people."' 9
Later, he informs us that Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese terrorist cult,
actually "attempted to disperse aerosolized botulinum toxin in Tokyo and
at several military installations in Japan."20 The result was not millions
15. Barton Gellman & Walter Pincus, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence,
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at Al.
16. Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Blair: A Just War, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 18, 2003,
at ]A.
17. Gostin, supra note 11, at 1119.
18. See, e.g., ANGELO ACQUISTA, THE SURVIVAL GUIDE: WHAT TO DO IN A BIOLOGICAL,
CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR EMERGENCY 188-89 (2003); Mark M. Hart, Disabling the Terror of
Radiological Dispersal, NUCLEAR NEWS, July 2003, at 40 (discussing "dirty bombs" and their
limited destructive ability);Tim Reid, Terror Attack? Don't Panic. You (and Your Hamster) Can
Survive It, TIMES (London), July I1, 2003, at 4.
19. Gostin, supra note 11, at 1115-16.
20. Id. at 1121.
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dead, or even thousands, or hundreds; rather, as Gostin notes, all of these
attacks "failed to kill anyone."'" He also cites a widely-discredited report
on the potential effects of "a release of 100 kilograms of aerosolized
anthrax over Washington, D.C.""2 The report "indicated that up to three
million deaths could occur."23 The real anthrax attacks through the U.S.
mail were highly effective in sowing terror in the population, but resulted
in only five deaths, the number killed in American hospitals by medical
error every thirty minutes, or on our nation's highways every hour. In
giving these examples, Gostin makes a common mistake: he fails to
distinguish between biological warfare, in which a government uses
biological agents to kill large numbers of people with the goal of
conquering a country, and bioterrorism, in which a private person or group
uses biological weapons to sow terror in a civilian population. No one, or
very few people, have to be (or are likely to be) killed in a successful
terrorist attack using biological agents. The goal is to sow terror, not to
kill.
Of course the scariest scenario involves smallpox because, unlike
botulinum or anthrax, smallpox can be transmitted from one person to
another. This is why the Bush Administration used the threat of a smallpox
attack from Iraq as one reason for us to fear Iraq, and as the almost sole
justification for its massive three-phase smallpox vaccination program.
That program has been a public-policy and public-relations disaster, with
fewer than 40,000 of the initially-proposed 500,000 health- care workers
vaccinated with the smallpox vaccine during phase one (phase two would
have encompassed up to ten million first responders and public-safety
personnel, and phase three would have included all willing civilians).24
Why?
I think the major reason is that the Administration failed to persuade
physicians and nurses that the known risks of serious side effects with the
vaccine were justified given the fact that there is no evidence that Iraq (or
anyone else) has both the smallpox virus and the wish to use it in a
terrorist attack. The information provided to the physicians and nurses on
this issue was analogous to the Iraqi nuclear-threat information, except it
contained no facts at all, not even misleading or phony ones. For example,
the Director of the CDC, the person in charge of the smallpox-vaccination
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1125.
23. Id.
24. Donald G. McNeil, 2 Programs to Vaccinate for Smallpox Come to a Halt, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2003, at AI3; Richard W. Stevenson & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Lays Out Plan on
Smallpox Shots: Military Is First, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at Al. For a persuasive analysis of
why the smallpox program failed, see generally William J. Bicknell & Kenneth D. Bloem,
Smallpox and Bioterrorism: Why the Plan to Protect the Nation is Stalled and What to Do, CATO
INST. BRIEFING PAPERS, Sept. 5, 2003.
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program, told a U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on January 29,
2003, after commencing the smallpox-vaccination campaign:
I can't discuss all of the details because some of the
information is, of course, classified. But I think our reading
of the intelligence that we share with the intelligence
community is that there is a real possibility of a smallpox
attack from either nations that are likely to be harboring the
virus or from individual entities, such as terrorist cells that
could have access to the virus. So we know it's not zero. And
I think that's really what we can say with absolute certainty
that there is not a zero risk of a smallpox attack."
This wonderful doubletalk proves nothing except that the CDC's
director honestly admitted that she had almost no knowledge of the risk of
a smallpox attack. More importantly, however, if the U.S. government
knows that an individual, group, or nation has smallpox and is working to
make it into a weapon, this information should be made public. It is the
terrorists who want to keep their methods and intentions secret: the best
defense for a potential target is to make this information public. Since
most Americans probably know this, the failure of the Administration to
offer any evidence at all of anyone possessing weaponized smallpox likely
meant that the Administration had no such evidence. Thus, the real risks
of the vaccine could not be offset by any measurable benefit.2 6 Few were
surprised then when after the Iraqi war, in August 2003, an Institute of
Medicine panel recommended that the Administration's emphasis on
smallpox vaccination for civilians be abandoned."
The bottom line is that the potential for biological terrorism is real (i.e.,
greater than zero), but very low, and in almost any foreseeable attack the
number of deaths is likely to be low (as evidenced in the only real
biological attacks to date, in which between zero and five people died).
But what about a new, worldwide pandemic? A repeat of the 1918 flu
epidemic is actually likely at some point, and could prove devastating (the
flu kills from 10,000 to 40,000 people a year in the U.S.).2" But we can
produce vaccines against the flu, and our new emphasis on bioterrorism
25. Smallpox Vaccination Plan, Hearing Before Senate Appropriations Comm., Subcomm.
on Labor, Health & Human Servs., & Educ., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Dr. Julie L.
Gerberding, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), available at www.lexis.com.
26. George J. Annas, Smallpox Vaccine: Not Worth the Risk, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.
1, 2003, at 6.
27. Elizabeth Olson, Panel Urges Shift in Preparing for Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2003, at A22.
28. See, e.g., PETE DAVIES, THE DEVIL'S FLU 68-69 (2000); GINA KOLATA, FLU: THE STORY
OF THE GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT
154 (1999); see also LANDON PEDIATRIC FOUND., INFLUENZA: VIRUS AND DISEASE (2003), at
http://www.medmall.org/Proflu/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
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has actually drained public health resources away from effective vaccines
to these much less lethal, if much more disturbing, threats.
29
Like almost everyone familiar with public health, I agree with Gostin
that the public health infrastructure generally must be improved for the
sake of the nation's health. Where we disagree is what effect bioterrorism
preparation should have on the public health infrastructure. I wrongly and
naively expected the federal government to provide increased funding for
public health generally in the wake of 9/11. There has been some funding
for bioterrorism. But most public health departments have been struggling
with more unfunded federal mandates and have had to divert funds from
public health programs that we know work to save lives and improve
health to pay for bioterrorism projects having little or no public health
payoff. My own state of Massachusetts, for example, always a national
leader in public health, has made major cuts in tobacco control, domestic-
violence prevention, and immunizations against pneumonia and hepatitis
A and B.3" Public health dollars have shrunk by thirty percent in two years,
during which time Massachusetts has received $21 million for
bioterrorism-related activities.3" Public health expert David Ozonoff of the
Boston University School of Public Health accurately describes what is
happening: "The whole bioterrorism initiative and what it's doing to public
health is a cancer, and it's hollowing out public health from within....
This is a catastrophe for American public health."32
So the first false premise underlying emergency public health
legislation is that the facts warrant categorizing bioterrorism as either more
risky than nuclear or conventional bombs, or as potentially lethal to
"millions" of Americans. Exaggerated risks, of course, produce extreme
responses. Public health planning should be based on science, especially
the science of epidemiology and accurate risk assessment and facts, not the
free-floating anxiety and fear that the government uses to justify more
control over individual citizens.
II. LOCK 'EM UP
Gostin's second false premise is that health and human rights cease to
complement each other in emergencies, so that the most effective way to
respond to a bioterrorist attack, should one occur, is to immediately trade
off human rights for public health and safety. Gostin is wrong to think that
I or other believers in democracy and constitutional rights think that the
29. Stephen Smith, Anthrax vs. the Flu: As State Governments Slash Their Public Health







government can never interfere with the civil rights of an individual.33 But,
he is certainly correct to think that I believe such situations will be
extremely rare (e.g., a person with active, contagious tuberculosis who
refuses to take medication while insisting on congregating with others),
and that I believe bioterrorist attacks do notjustify arbitrary governmental
action to forcibly drug or quarantine citizens, at least if there are (and there
almost always will be) other less restrictive alternatives.
I would go even further. I believe that a government response that is
seen by its citizens as arbitrary and compulsory will backfire, and actually
be counterproductive (Gostin acknowledges this as one possibility).
Infected individuals, for example, will avoid hospitals and public health
officials, rather than voluntarily seek out care, as thousands did during the
anthrax attacks. They will thus be much more likely to spread the disease
when they flee, as hundreds of thousands did in the capital of China when
they thought the city was going to be placed under marshal law during the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic.34 Some may
actually take up arms and actively resist the government should it try to
impose martial law. It is unlikely that our military or police will kill
Americans who resist forced treatment or who simply want to remain in
their homes with their families during an emergency. These are some of
the reasons why mass quarantines have never been effective in the U.S.,
as Gostin has acknowledged elsewhere.35 Nor are police and military
tactics likely to induce cooperation better than a knowledgeable authority
figure, like former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who leveled with
the public, told them what was known and what was not, and what the
government was doing about it. As Senator Sam Nunn, who played the
part of the president in the tabletop exercise Dark Winter, concluded after
it ended: "'There is no force on earth strong enough to get 250 million
Americans to do something that they do not believe is in their own best
interests or that of their families."' 36 The ability of the public to react
calmly when government officials and police do not panic was
demonstrated during the "great blackout of 2003 .,3
33. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Control of Tuberculosis: The Law and the Public's Health,
328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 586-87 (1993).
34. Charles Hutzler, China Reverts to Top-down Rule with Heavy Handto Fight SARS, WALL
ST. J., May 8, 2003, at A6.
35. Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the
United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286
JAMA 271 1, 2713-14 (2001).
36. Tara O'Toole, Address at Boston University School of Pubic Health (Oct. 18, 2002)
(quoting Senator Sam Nunn).
37. See, e.g., David Barstow, The Blackout of 2003, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003, at AI; see
generally The Blackout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003, at A16 (New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg refused to call in the National Gaurd during the blackout).
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Nonetheless, Gostin insists in his article that quarantines could be
effective "only if they are used during the early stages of the outbreak."3
But reliance on quarantine is misplaced. First, neither of the two major
biological weapons examples Gostin relies on for his portrayal of risk,
botulinum and anthrax,39 can be mitigated by quarantine because they are
not transmitted from one person to another. So quarantine itself is relevant
only for some biological agents. Even for this group, which includes
smallpox, it must be used almost immediately. But if public health action
is to be based on science and epidemiology, draconian public health
measures should not be used until there is some evidence that they will be
effective. As SARS teaches us, this will only come after at least some data
is collected and analyzed, and this will not be immediately.
Because, however, public health officials are much more concerned
with false negatives (failing to treat or detain someone who actually has
a communicable disease) than with false positives (detaining someone who
actually does not have a communicable disease), it is predictable that
public health officials with the power to arbitrarily quarantine large
numbers of people in an emergency will use it immediately, whether it is
warranted or not. From their perspective, protecting public health is more
important than protecting liberty, and as public health officials they really
have nothing to lose. Public health's job is to protect health, not liberty.
They see themselves, usually rightfully so, as the good guys, fighting evil.
The role of the law and lawyers, on the other hand, is to protect liberty and
constitutional rights. The American Bar Association's slogan gets it right:
"Defending Liberty, Pursuing Justice."
The Gostin proposal even provides public health officials (and those
working for them) with legal immunity for causing injury and even death
to individuals.4" Not only is there to be no compensation for monetary and
physical injuries suffered at the hands of public health officials in an
emergency, there is no accountability even if these injuries were caused
negligently. No wonder many public health officials like the idea of
immunity (who wouldn't want more power without any accountability for
how it is used?). But no wonder that such new powers are opposed by civil
libertarians and libertarians alike: they are dangerous because they will
predictably be misused and abused. Abuse of power will predictably instill
panic in the public, as it did in China and Taiwan during the SARS
epidemic. Even totalitarian dictatorships cannot control their populations
by fear alone in the twenty-first century. We can't predict a terrorist attack,
38. Gostin, supra note 11, at 1161.
39. Id. at 1115-18.
40. See CmR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, GEORGETOWN UNIV. & JOHN HOPKINS
UNIV., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(a) (Dec. 21, 2001), at
http://www.publichealthlaw.netlMSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
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but we can predict misuse and abuse of power. Justice Brandeis was right
when he wrote:
Experience will teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.4
Gostin is not so sure, but does admit that a "panicked public will
require a much greater force of peacekeepers-police or the National
Guard, for instance-to maintain order."'42 And Gostin follows this
sentence with an even more insightful one: "Building the public's trust
through communicating correct and timely information is crucial to
successful management of any emergency." '43 Yes. But then he loses the
point. Here it is: In the current environment of instant communication by
the Internet, cell phones, and twenty-four hour-a-day TV, it is much more
important for public health officials to manage information than it is to
manage people. The only effective way to govern Americans is to provide
them with complete and factual information about what is and is not
known about an attack or epidemic, and what steps they can take to protect
themselves and their families from harm. This is, unfortunately, something
the Bush Administration has consistently failed to do, relying instead on
"be vigilant" and "go about your business" platitudes.
Finally, it cannot be emphasized enough that the primary goal and
purpose of public health is prevention of disease in the first place. In the
case of bioterrorism, this maxim means that preventing an attack is far
more important (to public health) than responding to it after the fact.
Gostin's emergency act is about damage control. Modem public health is
about prevention of epidemics and bioterrorism. Prevention is not
primarily a local or state issue, but is fundamentally a global-security issue
that must be dealt with by the community of nations working together.
National laws and treaties, with realistic inspection and sanctions, devoted
to preventing the financing, development, and production of biological
weapons, are the most important tools in the prevention of bioterrorism."
State laws, no matter what they say, and no matter what the CDC says,
simply cannot prevent bioterrorism. Unfortunately, bad state public health
emergency laws are not only dangerous to liberty, they are a danger to
41. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42. Gostin, supra note 11, at 1167.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Bruce Alberts & Robert M. May, Scientist Support for Biological Weapons
Controls, 298 SCIENCE 1135, 1135 (2002).
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public health itself. They can make it much more likely that a bioterrorist
attack will be poorly managed by encouraging public health officials to act
in counterproductive ways that undermine public trust and actually
promote fear and panic. In short, by hyping fear of bioterrorism, and then
demanding unaccountable authority over its citizens in the event of an
attack, a state can actually sow the very terror it is trying to prevent. The
state itself can become the object of fear. In this regard, Florida's crude
version of Gostin's "model act" provides the country's starkest example.
III. FLORIDA'S SICK STATUTE
Florida has been at the center of national controversy from the outset
of the Bush Administration, primarily because of its vote counting and
recounting in the last presidential election. Nor are Jay Leno and Conan
O'Brien alone. After the U.S. Supreme Court awarded the election to
George W. Bush on totally unpersuasive reasoning about equal protection
for Florida voters, many Floridians sported buttons that read: "Equal
Protection My Ass. ' My guess is that the reaction of most people upon
learning about the provisions of Florida's version of the Gostin emergency,
powers act will be "Public Health Protection My Ass."
Perhaps because it was the site of the first anthrax letter attack, Florida
was fertile ground for all sorts of so-called antiterrorist legislation. Within
a year of 9/11, the Florida Legislature passed, and Governor Jeb Bush
signed, twenty-one bills related to terrorism. One of these twenty-one bills
was based, at least in part, on the Gostin model and passed the Florida
House 118-0 and the Senate 34-0.46 The bill was described as
45. Lawrence Tribe, eroG v. hsuB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gorefrom Its Hall of
Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 221 (2001).
46. Public Health Emergency Act, 36 FINALLEGIS. BILL INFo. 138-39 (2002). Florida Statute
§ 381.00315 (2002), the major provision of the act, reads:
Public health advisories; public health emergencies.-The State Health Officer is
responsible for declaring public health emergencies and issuing public health advisories.
(I) As used in this section, the term:
(a) "Public health advisory" means any warning or report giving information
to the public about a potential public health threat. Prior to issuing any public
health advisory, the State Health Officer must consult with any state or local
agency regarding areas of responsibility which may be affected by such advisory.
Upon determining that issuing a public health advisory is necessary to protect the
public health and safety, and prior to issuing the advisory, the State Health Officer
must notify each county health department within the area which is affected by the
advisory of the State Health Officer's intent to issue the advisory. The State
Health Officer is authorized to take any action appropriate to enforce any public
health advisory.
(b) "Public health emergency" means any occurrence, or threat thereof,
whether natural or man made, which results or may result in substantial injury or
harm to the public health from infectious disease, chemical agents, nuclear agents,
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biological toxins, or situations involving mass casualties or natural disasters. Prior
to declaring a public health emergency, the State Health Officer shall, to the
extent possible, consult with the Governor and shall notify the Chief of Domestic
Security Initiatives as created in s. 943.03. The declaration of a public health
emergency shall continue until the State Health Officer finds that the threat or
danger has been dealt with to the extent that the emergency conditions no longer
exist and he or she terminates the declaration. However, a declaration of a public
health emergency may not continue for longer than 60 days unless the Governor
concurs in the renewal of the declaration. The State Health Officer, upon
declaration of a public health emergency, may take actions that are necessary to
protect the public health. Such actions include, but are not limited to:
I. Directing manufacturers of prescription drugs or over-the-counter drugs
who are permitted under chapter 499 and wholesalers of prescription drugs located
in this state who are permitted under chapter 499 to give priority to the shipping
of specified drugs to pharmacies and health care providers within geographic areas
that have been identified by the State Health Officer. The State Health Officer
must identify the drugs to be shipped. Manufacturers and wholesalers located in
the state must respond to the State Health Officer's priority shipping directive
before shipping the specified drugs.
2. Notwithstanding chapters 465 and 499 and rules adopted thereunder,
directing pharmacists employed by the department to compound bulk prescription
drugs and provide these bulk prescription drugs to physicians and nurses of county
health departments or any qualified person authorized by the State Health Officer
for administration to persons as part of a prophylactic or treatment regimen.
3. Notwithstanding s. 456.036, temporarily reactivating the inactive license
of the following health care practitioners, when such practitioners are needed to
respond to the public health emergency: physicians licensed under chapter 458 or
chapter 459; physician assistants licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459;
licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, and advanced registered nurse
practitioners licensed under part I of chapter 464; respiratory therapists licensed
under part V of chapter 468; and emergency medical technicians and paramedics
certified under part III of chapter 401. Only those health care practitioners
specified in this paragraph who possess an unencumbered inactive license and
who request that such license be reactivated are eligible for reactivation. An
inactive license that is reactivated under this paragraph shall return to inactive
status when the public health emergency ends or prior to the end of the public
health emergency if the State Health Officer determines that the health care
practitioner is no longer needed to provide services during the public health
emergency. Such licenses may only be reactivated for a period not to exceed 90
days without meeting the requirements of s. 456.036 or chapter 401, as applicable.
4. Ordering an individual to be examined, tested, vaccinated, treated, or
quarantined for communicable diseases that have significant morbidity or
mortality and present a severe danger to public health. Individuals who are unable
or unwilling to be examined, tested, vaccinated, or treated for reasons of health,
religion, or conscience may be subjected to quarantine.
a. Examination, testing, vaccination, or treatment may be performed by any
qualified person authorized by the State Health Officer.
b. If the individual poses a danger to the public health, the State Health Officer
may subject the individual to quarantine. If there is no practical method to
quarantine the individual, the State Health Officer may use any means necessary
to vaccinate or treat the individual.
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follows in the September 1, 2002 issue of the Florida Bar News:
This bill extends immunity from civil liability under the Good
Samaritan Act to persons who gratuitously and in good faith
render emergency care or treatment in direct response to
emergency situations arising out of a public health
emergency. This immunity is extended to licensed hospitals,
employees of hospitals, and any doctor licensed to practice
medicine who in good faith renders medical care necessitated
by a public health emergency. This bill takes effect upon
becoming law.47
The Orlando Sentinel, in a review of bills passed and defeated in the
2002 legislative session described the bill even more succinctly:
"Emergencies. Safeguards hospitals and doctors from lawsuits during a
public health crisis."48 In the current so-called medical-malpractice crisis,
it is not surprising that immunity for physicians acting in publicly-declared
emergencies has support in a strongly conservative state led by a very
conservative governor. The legislation also had an easy time of it because
the bill required no expenditures at all from the state. On the other hand,
as I have argued elsewhere,49 when public health officials detain or injure
individuals because they are acting to protect the community as a whole,
the individual should be compensated for harm by the community. After
all, the injury was suffered in an effort to protect the community.
Unaccountable power in this respect is not only dangerous, it is manifestly
unfair to Floridians.
The law adopts the Gostin scheme of declaring a public health
emergency to trigger additional government powers, but vests this power
not in the state's governor, where it traditionally resides, but in the state's
"health officer." The State Health Officer's emergency powers are
specified, and listed in four categories: (1) the shipment of drugs in the
state, (2) the provision of bulk drugs by pharmacists, (3) the temporary
licensing of certain health care practitioners, and (4) power over
individuals. There are major problems with all of the provisions
(especially the extraordinarily broad definition of "public health
Any order of the State Health Officer given to effectuate this paragraph shall
be immediately enforceable by a law enforcement officer under s. 381.0012.
(2) Individuals who assist the State Health Officer at his or her request on a
volunteer basis during a public health emergency are entitled to the benefits
specified in s. 110.504(2), (3), (4), and (5).
Id.
47. Dudley Goodlette& Dan Gelber, Legislative Response to 9/11, FLA. BAR NEWS, Sept. 1,
2002, at 1.
48. How Bills Fared in 2002, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 24, 2002, at A12.
49. E.g., Annas, Civil Liberties, supra note 5, at 1341.
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emergency" which, for example, would include annual flu epidemics and
Human Imuno-deficiency Virus), but the powers over individuals section
is so out of step with anything else in the rest of the country, and so
inconsistent with basic constitutional law, that it warrants special scrutiny.
This again brings Hiassen's Sick Puppy to mind. The lobbyist owner of
the laborador retriver Boodle would not have been surprised that the
Florida Legislature passed and the governor signed this bill, especially
since it was summarized by the media (and probably by those lobbying for
it) simply as an emergency medical-immunity bill, like an expanded Good
Samaritan medical-immunity law. For Boodle's owner, Florida was a
perfect place to hone one's lobbying skills in preparation for a career in
Washington. He had the requisite skill for it: "He was adept at smoothing
over problems among self-important shitheads."5 °
But bioterrorist preparedness is much more than simply a "problem"
that needs "smoothing over," and the Florida statute makes the problem
worse by placing unrestrained power in the hands of one unelected and
possibly "self-important" individual. The operative section gives the State
Health Officer the following power over individuals in a public health
emergency:
4. Ordering an individual to be examined, tested,
vaccinated, treated, or quarantined for communicable diseases
that have significant morbidity or mortality and present a
severe danger to public health. Individuals who are unable or
unwilling to be examined, tested, vaccinated, or treated for
reasons of health, religion, or conscience may be subjected to
quarantine.
a. Examination, testing, vaccination, or treatment may be
performed by any qualified person authorized by the State
Health Officer.
b. If the individual poses a danger to the public health, the
State Health Officer may subject the individual to quarantine.
If there is no practical method to quarantine the individual,
the State Health Officer may use any means necessary to treat
the individual.
Any order of the State Health Officer given to effectuate this
paragraph shall be immediately enforceable by a law
enforcement officer ....
This measure passed the Florida Legislature in early 2002 and went to
Governor Jeb Bush in April, who signed it. These provisions of the bill
track the law enforcement provisions of the October 2001 Gostin proposal,
but even Gostin and his colleagues themselves had repudiated them in
50. HIAASEN, supra note 4, at 394.
51. FLA. STAT. § 381.00315(1)(b).
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their December 2001 revision, by which time the CDC had made it clear
it did not endorse the measure either.52 The Florida Legislature does not
seem to have gotten the memo.
Nor has Gostin shown any displeasure with the Florida legislation,
which he has consistently listed, as he does in footnote 151 of his article,
as one of the states that his proposal "influenced." In the same footnote he
also lists Minnesota. But Minnesota's law could not be more different; it
takes a human rights and health approach. Specifically, the Minnesota law
provides: "individuals have a fundamental right to refuse medical
treatment, testing, physical or mental examination, vaccination,
participation in experimental procedures and protocols, collection of
specimens, and preventative (sic) treatment programs" even in a public
health emergency.53 The fact that Gostin lists both together without
comment seems to indicate an absence of concern with which principles
of law should govern emergency health powers.
Other groups are concerned with legal principles. Governor Bush, for
example, heard from the Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons which accurately warned him that "imposing medical treatments
on unwilling citizens at gunpoint, or with threats of taking children from
their parents, or with other coercive measures-obliterating informed
consent and due process of law ...could be disastrous."'54 These
consequentialist arguments did not move the Governor, and it is probable
that human rights and constitutional arguments would not have altered his
decision to sign the legislation. But because the law actually encourages
lawlessness and can only foster public distrust of public health officials,
it should be repealed, and replaced with the language of the Minnesota
law.
All four parts of section four are horrific on their face, each for its own
reason. The first part, which authorizes the "ordering an individual to be
examined . . ." makes no public health sense at all, because there is no
characteristic of the individual that gives rise to any suspicion or reason to
believe that the individual either has the disease in question or has been
exposed to the disease. Instead, the mere presence in Florida of a disease
that the State Health Officer designates as creating a "public health
emergency" authorizes anyone designated as "qualified" by the State
Health Officer to order anyone to be "examined, tested, vaccinated, treated
or quarantined." Mere refusal results in quarantine, without any evidence
even of exposure to disease, let alone that the person is a threat to others.
52. See, e.g., Annas, Civil Liberties, supra note 5, at 1340.
53. MINN. STAT. § 12.39 (2003).
54. Letter from Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, to Governor Jeb Bush
(Apr. 2, 2002), available at www.aapsonline.org/press/jebbushlet.htm; see also Doctors Tell Gov.
Bush: Veto Forced Drug Bill, U.S. NEWSwIRE, Apr. 3, 2002 (State Desk); Jonathan Turley, A
Prescription for Disaster, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2002, at 15.
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This is not public health, this is a police state. And it exemplifies the
core mistake of the entire approach: Americans (Floridians) are not the
enemy in a bioterrorist attack, and to prearrange a response that has the
police seek out, confine, and forcibly inject innocent Floridians fosters
terror rather than responds to it. The enemy is the bioterrorist-although
neither current law nor this Florida statute would permit police to "use any
means necessary" to apprehend a suspected bioterrorist. This law not only
misses the target, it shoots in the wrong direction altogether.
The second part, 4.a, seems innocuous enough, but begs the question
of what makes a person "qualified." At the very least one would think that
the section should refer to the state's medical licensing laws, as modified
by paragraph three of the act which provides for the temporary reactivating
of inactive licenses." But this provision has no such limitation, and in an
emergency it is not hard to believe that the State Health Officer might
designate anyone he or she can get as "qualified" under the circumstances,
including patently unqualified people. This will, of course, be both
frightening to and dangerous for Floridians who are seeking medical
advice and treatment.
It is difficult to believe that anyone in the legislature actually read the
text of this law, especially the third part, 4.b. The first sentence makes
perfect sense, and summarizes the law in virtually every state: "If the
individual poses a danger to the public health, the State Health Officer
may subject the individual to quarantine,"56 at least if the phrase "provided
this is the least restrictive alternative available" is understood. But the
second sentence has no legal pedigree at all (at least outside of totalitarian
states): "If there is no practical method to quarantine the individual, the
State Health Officer may use any means to vaccinate or treat the
individual."57 This should be labeled the "torture exception." If the risk is
high enough to society, we can torture bioterrorists (and their victims!).
But governments cannot engage in torture (or slavery or murder) under
any circumstances, even where the survival of the country is at risk.5"
Because it violates the international criminal law prohibition on torture, it
55. FLA. STAT. § 381.00315(1)(b)3.
56. Id. § 381.00315(l)(b)4b.
57. Id.
58. Torture is absolutely prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GOAR 3d Comm., 21st Sess., 496th plen. Mtg., at 53 (1966), and
there are no exceptions to the prohibition, even when the "survival of the nation" is at stake (which
it never is in a bioterrorist attack, in any event). Some might argue that having police restrain a
competent adult to inject him with a substance is "treatment," not torture, but how would we
categorize this act if done by an enemy to a U.S. prisoner of war? Caleb Carr makes the case that
to have any hope of finally ending it, terrorism must be categorized in the same absolute prohibition
terms in international law (i.e. as a crime against humanity) as torture, slavery, and genocide.
CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR: A HISTORY OF WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIANS 15-30
(2002).
is (or at least should be) shocking to see it as part of an alleged public
health law.
For most potential bioterrorist agents there is neither an approved
vaccine nor an effective treatment. Even for garden variety new epidemics
that could qualify as public health emergencies under the statute, like
SARS, what can this provision possibly mean? That the State Health
Officer can compel the use of potentially dangerous experimental drugs?
But this is a fundamental violation not only of international law, but also
of basic U.S. constitutional law, and U.S. federal drug laws.59 No state law
can, of course, overturn any, let alone all, of these higher laws. But even
assuming that there is a vaccine that also could serve as a treatment if
delivered to an exposed person quickly (the smallpox vaccine seems to
have been what whoever drafted this language was likely thinking about),
59. The end of World War II was marked by the birth of the international human rights
movement, the formation of the United Nations, and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The "Doctors' Trial" was an important piece of this picture. U.S. judges, presiding
under military jurisdiction in Nuremberg, Germany, found fifteen Nazi physicians guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity for their actions in conducting or authorizing lethal and
torturous medical experiments on concentration camp inmates. More importantly, the court
articulated what has come to be called the Nuremberg Code, which sets forth the legal requirements
for human experimentation. The most significant provision is the first of ten:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. . . . [T]he
person involved should have the legal capacity to give consent; should be so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of
constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension
of the elements of the subject matter involved so as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision....
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, NUREMBERG CODE: DIRECTIVES FOR HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION § 1 (1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/nuremberg.php3.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares bodily integrity central
to both human rights and human dignity, providing in Article 5, for example, that "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, Ist sess. (1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. Most physicians, of course, do not view human
experimentation as torture, but the treaty that followed the declaration, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, made the link unmistakable by adding an additional sentence to the
UDHR's Article 5 in its Article 7: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent
to medical or scientific experimentation." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 58. This provision is, of course, now a fundamental precept of international human
rights law. Moreover, under the treaty, Article 7 is nonderogable, "even in situation of public
emergency" which threatens the life ofthe nation. Convention on Civil and Political Rights General
Comment 20, U.N. Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, 44th Sess. (1992), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. U.S. federal drug laws also prohibit the use of investigational
drugs and vaccines without informed consent.
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what possible justification can there be for forcing the vaccination "by any
means"? The state gives only one, "if there is no practical method to
quarantine the individual." But the entire statute is based on the premise
that state public health officials know how to respond to a public health
emergency and should have the power to quarantine if needed. This is
analogous to saying that if the state has no prisons, it can summarily
execute suspects.
This provision also undercuts the assumption that state public health
officials have done any planning at all, and instead assumes that the state
will not be able to even provide quarantine facilities where
needed-although it can also be read more cynically, to say the state need
not bother to quarantine vaccination refusers, but can simply force
vaccination on everyone. Either way, there is no constitutional justification
for forced treatment. Americans have a constitutional right to refuse any
medical treatment, even lifesaving treatment.6" Even criminal defendants
who are in police custody and are incompetent to stand trial without
treatment have a legal right to refuse treatment in virtually all cases.6 An
emergency may justify very short periods of confinement of individuals
whom public health officials believe pose a risk to others, but nothing
justifies this type of torture.62
Finally, the fourth part of the section provides that "any order of the
State Health Officer given to effectuate this paragraph shall be
immediately enforceable by a law enforcement officer .... ,,6' This
provision transforms public health into law enforcement, and ineffective
law enforcement at that.
It is also worth doing a thought experiment here. What can the Florida
legislature possibly have been thinking when it passed this law? The
model seems to assume that public health personnel, accompanied by
physicians and police officers, will go door-to-door to locate Floridians
and vaccinate them in the event of a bioterrorist attack. But this seems
60. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (competent individuals have
a constitutional right to refuse any medical treatment, even life-saving or life-sustaining treatment);
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (same). These cases are discussed in George J. Annas,
The Bell Tollsfora Constitutional RighttoPhysician-AssistedSuicide, 337 NEWENG. J. MED. 1098
(1997).
61. See Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (2003) (prisoner awaiting trial may not
be medicated against his will to make him competent to stand trial, without a judicial hearing and
a finding that the medication is both "necessary" to further essential governmental interests and is
"in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition").
62. See terrorism cases in which suspected terrorists, even those whose activities threaten the
survival of the nation, must be brought before a judge in a reasonably short time period. E.g.,
Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 553-55 (1996); Castillo Petruzzi
Case, Inter-Am C.H.R. 127, OEA Ser. C, doc. 52 (1999). See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW
OF ASYLUM IN THE UNrED STATES (3d ed. 1999); Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 254-95
(Supp. 2003).
63. FLA. STAT. § 381.0315(l)(b) (2002).
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absurd for at least three reasons: first, in an emergency, the police will be
needed to maintain order-and if the police panic, the public will likely
panic as well; second, people who trust their physicians and public
officials will voluntarily go to places where they can be screened and
treated or vaccinated-those who do not want to be treated or screened
will do whatever it takes to avoid this, and will neither go to treatment
centers nor stay home waiting for public health officials to arrive; and
third, physicians and nurses will not simply "follow orders" and treat
Floridians against their will.
Even in the wake of 9/11 and the drumbeat of the threat of a possible
smallpox attack, no other state has enacted anything like this statute. The
Florida Legislature should be ashamed of itself. Protecting Public Health
My Ass.
Hiaasen would understand. Near the end of Sick Puppy the former
governor of Florida, who has turned radical environmentalist, confronts
the current governor of Florida, who is busy helping developers destroy
Florida's environment. Left alone with the governor, the former governor
tackles him, pulls down his pants, and cuts something into his ass. Later
the governor realizes he is bleeding, and looks in the mirror to read the
word "SHAME" written in blood on his behind.
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